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NOTES
BURGLARY
Defendant was indicted for burglary under Section 901 of the Act of 1939,
P. L. 872, 18 P. S. Sec. 4901, which provides:
"Whoever, at any time, wilfully and maliciously, enters any building, with
intent to commit any felony therein, is guilty of burglary."
The evidence established the following facts: Mrs. Charland was in her
bed room on the first floor of her home when she saw the defendant at her bed
room window. The defendant broke the lower pane of the window with his fist.
She requested him to leave and when he failed to go, instead of. making 
an
outcry, she told him that she would have him arrested. She went to the home
of a neighbor for the purpose of calling the police, having first turned on the lights
in her home. The defendant, seeing her on the neighbor's porch, walked toward
her, then turned, went upon her porch, and entered her house, the front door
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having been left open by her. A few minutes later he came out of the house
and walked away. There was no evidence of any act "toward the person of Mrs.
Charland."
The jury returned a verdict of "an attempt to break and enter building with
intent to commit rape."
The verdict was affirmed by the Superior Court. Commonwealtl6 v. Ellis,
154 Super. 227, 35 At. (2d) 533.
The verdict was incorrect for the following reasons:
(1) The defendant was indicted for "entering," etc., and he was convicted
of "an attempt to break and enter." The Superior Court did not discuss this point,
but the Supreme Court said the verdict "is permitted by the Act of 1939, P. L. 872,
Sec. 1107, 18 P. S. Sec. 5107." This act provides that when one is indicted
for a crime, if the evidence shows that he did not complete the offense, charged,
he may be convicted of an attempt to commit the crime. It does not provide that
he may be convicted of an attempt to do something else.
(2) There was not sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to
commit rape upon Mrs. Charland. The Superior Court said "the jury was en-
tirely justified in concluding that the defendant intended to commit rape."
Judge Kenworthy, dissenting, said that he could not "find anything from which
it could be inferred, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant entered the
house with intent to commit rape." The Supreme Court said there was "no evi-
dence of an intention to commit a felonious act against Mrs. Charland."
The statute makes criminal the entering of a building with intent to commit
a felony therein. As Judge Kenworthy remarks how could the defendant enter
a building with the intention of raping Mrs. Charland therein when he knew
that she was standing on the porch of a neighboring house.
(3) The Supreme Court said "there was no act sufficiently proximate to
the alleged intended crime to constitute a criminal attempt." The defendant
was not indicted for rape and he was not convicted of an attempt to rape. He
was indicted for "entering," etc. He broke the window with his fist, and, as-
suming that he- intended to enter, that was sufficiently proximate to entering to
constitute an attempt to enter.
Further, he did enter when he walked in the door. The fact that he did
enter would, according to some authorities, preclude, his conviction of a mere
attempt to entry, but an entry is certainly "one of the natural series of acts re-
quired for the commission of the crime" of entering, and this was the test adopted
by the Supreme Court as to whether an act constituted an attempt. Common-
wealth v. Ellis. 349 Pa. 402, 37 A. (2d) 504.
W. H. HITCHLER.
